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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
At the time of the passage of this act, under the provisions of Chapter
65, of the Statutes, the school board of the city of Milwaukee was
authorized to submit to the common council of the city an estimate of
the moneys required for the ensuing fiscal year. It was the duty of the
common council to include such amount in the tax budget. Subsection
(7) of Section 65.08 gave the common council power to levy annually
a tax based on the taxable property of the city, an amount for: "A
school repair fund for keeping in repair school buildings, fixtures,
grounds, and fences; the purchase of furniture; the making of better-
ments to school property; and the purchase of necessary additions to
school sites, not exceeding eight tenths of a mill."
Subsequent to the passage of the Home Rule Amendment, the legis-
lature amended this act, raising the eight-tenth mill rate allowed in the
former act to a rate of one mill. The Milwaukee School Board using
this latter rate as their basis of computation, submitted to the Milwaukee
Common Council their estimate to be included in the tax budget. This
the council refused to do, claiming that among its recently acquired
powers was that of control over the city schools and that having elected
to come under the provisions of Section 66.ooi, it was not bound by
the later legislative act raising the rate of tax allowed, from eight tenths
of a mill to one mill. The school board thereupon secured an alternative
writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court seeking to compel the
common council to include in its tax budget for 1926 the sum demanded
for school repairs, and so forth. The city moved to quash this writ
and it was upon this motion that the recent decision was given.
The court upheld the school board saying that the legislature had
never placed the schools of a city under the management of the common
council. In all city charters, whether general or special, the schools
have been placed under the control and management of a body known
as the Board of Education. In view of this holding, questions im-
mediately arise as to the control the common councils of municipalities
have over many other independent boards such as city service com-
missions, park boards and fire and police commission boards, since many
of these were created by state statute. The boards also are authorized
to submit estimates of their requirements to the common council to be
included in the tax budget. It is only a matter of conjecture then, what
the Supreme Court's ruling will be when cases of this nature come
before it. The case just decided has the distinction that it involves
the matter of education which is fundamentally a state function, subject
to the control of the legislature, and never given over to the control of
the municipality.
R. F. R.
Sales: A practical manner of handling "time payments."-The
practice of buying various commodities on the "time payment plan,"
though not a new idea, has seen its greatest development during the
past decade. The system may be considered as the natural outgrowth
of two influences working toward the same end,-the manufacturer
seeking to create a greater market for his products, and the great so-
called middle class of people straining themselves for the greater enjoy-
ment, convenience and comfort which had been limited heretofore to
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those of means and who were able to pay or secure large extended
credit. This system is particularly appealing to this middle class, the
great mass whose regular family income is usually the salary of one
wage-earner, for, by budgeting the income and expenditures, and mak-
ing use of some plan of time-payment, they are enabled to purchase and
acquire many things in a gradual way for which payment in a lump
sum would be impossible.
Accompanying the numerous beneficial phases, however, are several
problems in the attending actual business transaction which present
considerable difficulty. This is particularly true from the standpoint of
the vending company. What is the simplest and most efficacious manner
of handling this class of business? How is the contract to be framed
so as to afford the vendor the greatest possible protection against de-
faults in payment or against conflicting claims of third parties? How
far can the rigidity of the bargain be forced without creating such
great sales resistance as would make the prospective purchaser reticent
about entering the deal? All these queries have been asked by the host
of jobbers and distributors seeking to use some form of the deferred
payment scheme. They have been answered quite satisfactorily by the
adoption and use of a form of conditional sales contract. The following
clauses are extracts from such a contract, it being an agreement for the
conditional sale of an oil-burning device which, in conjunction with a
furnace or boiler, is used in the heating of homes.
Said customer agrees that he will not rem6ve said apparatus from the above
mentioned premises, or will he assign, sell, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of the
.same without the written consent of the company, and that he will not place or
permit to be placed any lien upon the above mentioned premises.
It is expressly understood that the title to the said property shall be held by
the company until the amount of the full purchase price has been paid.In the event that the customer shall make default of the above named sums or
shall make default in any conditions of this agreement, the whole amount remain-ing unpaid shall at the option of the company at once become due and payable, and
the company may enter the premises of the customer and take possession of the
said property and remove and sell the same. The failure to exercise such option
at the time of any default shall not operate as a waiver of the right to exercise
such option at the time of any subsequent default.If and when such property, or any part thereof, shall be attached to the free-hold so as to entitle the company to a lien, it shall not be deemed that the com-
pany has waived its right to such lien on such property. In the event of such
attachment to the freehold, and such default in payment on the part of the cus-
tomer as to entitle the company to retake possession and sell, it is agreed that the
sale shall be held after the date of retaking of possession in the above mentioned
offices of the company.
The contract, as worded and framed, does not present so intricate
and formidable a legal instrument as to frighten the prospective pur-
chaser and yet it preserves and creates certain rights in the vendor
which are invaluable from a practical viewpoint.
In the first place, it implies that the goods shall remain, as between
the vendor and vendee,' personalty, though it admits of a possibility of
the device being in some cases attached to the freehold. This inter-
pretation and the express provision to allow removal and sale, permits
1 Such limitation can be effective only between the vendor and vendee and can-
not abridge the rights of a mortgagee of the freehold.
Fuller-Warren Co. v. Harter, IiO Wis. go, 85 N.W. 698.
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the vendor to proceed under section 122.16, Wis. Stats. in the event of
a default. Thus the vendor has an effective remedy and is protected
almost completely against loss; likewise, the necessity of elaborate legal
proceedings to secure relief is avoided.
Whether or not the device actually does in any particular case become
a part of the realty depends primarilly upon the intent of the contracting
parties, 2 and also upon the question of whether or not the apparatus is
actually and physically incorporated into the realty,3 whether or not it
can be removed from the premises without great damage and the
premises left in their former condition. 4 Should the subject matter
of the contract be so installed and used as to render it a part of the
realty, the vendor has the addditional right of lien5 which may be ex-
ercised any time during the six months succeeding delivery. As usual
payment schemes run over a period of twelve months, this is sufficient
time for the company to estimate the possibility of complete satisfaction
of the contract price. Should there be any doubt as to what course to
take, the vendor could file a lien and hold it in abeyance upon a default
within the six months period.6
The provision for holding the sale in the offices of the company, while
it complies with the statutory provision for a public sale (due notice
being given) 7 avoids the great amount of trouble and delay which
ordinarily attends the resale of goods at public auction, and provides
a direct and expeditious manner of settlement. The company can bid
in, on its own behalf, and usually get the goods at a very nominal price.
Protection against mortgagees of the realty is not available to the
company under the contract, but careful investigation will usually"
apprise them of any such lien. Neither can the company be protected
if the goods, having become real property, were purchased by a lessee,
who, in default of his payments, subsequently vacates the premises.
Such danger can only be avoided by the company's refusal to extend
the privilege of time payment to lessors, or to demand, before accepting
such contract, the written consent of the owner to place a lien on the
realty involved. Careful compliance with the statutory provisions for
the recording of the instrument will protect the company against claims
of bona fide purchasers from the vendee, and, all in all, the contract
provides most every protection required, besides giving the vending
company speedy relief at a minimum of expense, trouble, and delay.
It is also of importance, from the business standpoint, that while mere
notes from purchasers to vending companies will not be accepted by
the various acceptance companies as security for loans, these contracts
are fully recognized as thoroughly good security.
The numerous jobbers and distributors holding multitudinous contracts
of this general nature have found them to be most satisfactory in pro-
tecting them to the extent in which they are financially involved, under
'Rinzel v. Stumpf, 116 Wis. 287, 93 N.W. 36.
'Rinzel v. Stumpf, supra,
" Sec. 122.o7, Wis. Stats.
'Sec. 289.o6, Wis. Stats.
Sec. 289.o6, Wis. Stats.
7 Sec. 1-2.19, Wis. Stats.
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practically any and all circumstances, and all this with very little of the
usually accompanying legal red tape and expense.
B.C.
Sales: False representations by seller: As to matters of law:
Statement that alcoholic beverage could be legally sold.-
And Noe, a husbandman, drinking of the wine, was made drunk, and was un-
covered in his tent.
And Noe, awaking from the wine, when he learned what his younger son had
done to him,
He said: Cursed be Chanaan!
Genesis, Chap. 9, Verses 20-25
Neither a new nor a novel application of the law respecting fraud was
made in the recent case of Ad. Dernehl and Sons Company v. Detert,
186 Wis. 113, 202 N. W. 207. But it is worthy of comment as an
illustration of the law's love for fictions and legal precedent. In this, an
action for the value of goods purchased to be sold as a beverage and
which contained an unlawful percentage of alcohol, a counterclaim for
damages caused by defendant's arrest on the basis of representation by
the plaintiff that it had special permission from the prohibition officers
of the United States and Wisconsin to sell the goods to the defendant;
that it had a copy of the law which permitted the sale of the same and
that it knew the law permitted such sale to the defendant, was held
demurrable, these being representations as to the law and not of fact,
defendant being charged with knowledge of the law, and that though
the matter of special permission was in the nature of fact, the defendant
was charged with knowledge that such permission could not lawfully
be given.
This case illustrates the general rule that in the absence of confidential
relations a misrepresentation as to a matter of law is not a fraud, being
considered as a mere statement of opinion.' Gormely v. Gymnastic
Association, 55 Wis. 35, 13 N. W. 242, also a liquor case, governed
the instant case on a similar state of facts. The fact that the Gormely
case was a typical "cow case" made it difficult to consider and apply the
exception to the general rule, i.e.,-where one has superior means of
information, professes a knowledge of the law and thereby obtains an
unconscionable advantage over another who has not been in a situation
to become informed, the injured party is entitled to relief as well as if
the representation had been made concerning a matter of fact.2
A wider application of this modification of the general rule would
seem to be desirable in the present complex state of society where
mutual trust and confidence are the very life of business and where it
Upton v. Trbilcock, 91 U.S. 45; Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Worten, 113 Ala.
409, 22 So. 288; Platt v. Scott, (Ind.) 6 Black, 389, 39 Am. Dec. 436; Parker v.
Thomas, 19 Ind. 213, 81 Am. Dec. 385; Thompson v. Phwnix Ins. Co., 75 Me. 55,
46 Am. Rep. 357. See also, 68 Am. Dec. 376; i8 A.S.R. 559; 1I L.R.A. 197;
35 L.R.A. 420; 37 L.R.A. 6o5; Ann. Cas 1913., 1143 et seq.
'White v. Harrigan, 77 Okl. 123, x86 Pac. 224; Jordan v. Stevens, 51 Me. 78,
81 Am. Dec. 556 at p. 559. See also notes, 9 A.L.R. 1O51 and 12 R.C.L. 296.
